Abstract
Islamic Education in Southeast Asia reflects
the diversity of Islam in that part of the world and of course plays a central
role in shaping and transmitting the region’s religious traditions. this work
concludes that Southeast Asia has an extraordinarily large and well-developed
structure of Islamic education that can be a resource of critical importance in
the ongoing war of ideas within Islam.
Keywords :
Islamic Education; Southeast Asia;
Introduction
Islamic Education in Southeast Asia reflects
the diversity of Islam in that part of the world and of course plays a central
role in shaping and transmitting the region’s religious traditions. Therefore,
before discussing the structure of Islamic education in Southeast Asia, it
might be worth outlining the politico-religious and ideological context in
which Islamic educational institutions are embedded.[1]
Southeast Asian Islam
One of the most striking characteristics of
Southeast Asian Islam as a whole is the relative absence, until the latter part
of the twentieth century, of extremist Salafi or Wahhabi variants of the
religion. Moreover, Southeast Asian Islam remains extraordinarily diverse—a
reflection of the fact that the majority of Muslims throughout the region
incorporate local cultural, ethnic, and linguistic traditions into their
practice of Islam. This tendency—which is referred to as “traditionalism” in
Indonesia—is quite removed in spirit and practice from Wahhabi severity and
intolerance, and is especially strong on the Indonesian island of Java,
particularly East Java.
For the most part, traditionalist Muslims in
Southeast Asia adhere to the Syafi’i (in Arabic, Shafi’i) mazhab (school of
jurisprudence). Indonesian traditionalists are represented by the Nahdlatul
Ulama (Awakening of the Ulama—NU), the largest social welfare organization in
the Muslim world with a claimed membership of over 40 million. The organization
was founded in 1926 by a group of kiai (traditional
Islamic teachers), who were alarmed by the inroads made by modernists. NU seeks
to conserve the Javanese tradition in the organization’s religious beliefs and
practices—for instance, the practice of ziarah kubur (the
visiting of graves), in which contact is established with the spirit of the
deceased.[2]
NU’s original constitution committed it to a
range of religious, social and economic activities, but first and foremost was
the promotion of religious education.The authority of the ulama and the strength of the organization are rooted
in thousands of NU-affiliated pesantren (religious
boarding schools). Although representing traditionalist Islam, the NU
leadership has endeavored to adapt to modern conditions. Under the chairmanship
of Abdurrahman Wahid in the 1980s and 1990s, the curriculum in the NU pesantren was reformed significantly, and secular
subjects were taught in conjunction with traditional religious subjects. The NU
leadership also worked through associated foundations and research institutes
to promote a democratic civil society and to reconcile Islam with Indonesian
nationalism and democracy.[3]
The second important tendency within
Southeast Asian Islam is modernism. In Indonesia, modernism is part of a
movement that began at the turn of the 20th century. It was influenced by the
ideas of such thinkers as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh and aimed
to purify Indonesian Islam of what was considered to be heterodox practices.
The founders of Muhammadiyah, established in 1912 as the institutional
expression of the Indonesian modernist movement, wanted to banish the
“superstition” associated with some of the practices of traditionalist
Indonesian Islam, and also to counterbalance the development of Catholic and
Protestant missions. Today, Muhammadiyah is heavily involved in education,
health care, orphanages, and other social services with Islam as its
ideological and moral basis.
Unlike conservative Salafis, Indonesian
modernists believe in adjusting syariat law (in
Arabic, sharia) to the contemporary world. In the view of
Muhammadiyah chairman Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Islamic law needs to be reformed,
since in many cases it is no longer contextual to modern conditions.[4]
In recent years there has been a convergence, at least at the level of the
elites, of NU and Muhammadiyah attitudes and religious practices. Some NU members
who studied in Middle Eastern universities have become more receptive to the
principle of ijtihad (independent reasoning), which is central to
modernist Islam. The new discourse on gender equality has also gained greater
acceptance within NU, and rejection of polygamy is now very strong among the
younger generation. The Muhammadiyah, too, has undergone some significant
transformation. In the past, it was opposed to Sufi practices. Today, however,
increasing numbers of Muhammadiyah members practice Sufism. Despite this
convergence, important differences between the two groups remain, especially
between their respective modes of political engagement: The Muhammadiyah
focuses on promoting religious renewal through education and social services,
while Nahdlatul Ulama is focused more on traditional education and practices.[5]
This convergence of the two pillars of
moderate and progressive Islam in Indonesia is juxtaposed against a trend
toward radicalism in other sectors of Indonesian Islam. These radical interpretations
are associated with what Islamic activist Whasvi Velasufah calls the “Modern Islamic
Movement,” which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the worldwide wave
of Islamization.[6] These
groups include Hizbut-Tahrir and Jamaah Tarbiyah, which both support the
establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, the Jamaah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin
Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood), and other extremist groups that
emerged in the immediate post-Suharto period.
As in the rest of Southeast Asia, the influx
of Saudi money and ideology in Indonesia has been an important engine of this
radicalization. The Saudi religious affairs office in Jakarta finances the
translation from Arabic to Bahasa Indonesia of about one million books a year.
It also offers scholarships to Indonesian students for study in Saudi
universities.[7] Arab
influences are also exerted through the Hadrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia.[8]
Islamic extremism in Indonesia is often
associated with clerics of Arabic origin. For example, Ja’afar Umar Thalib,
leader of the now disbanded Laskar Jihad; Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and the late
Abdullah Sungkar, founders of Jemaah Islamiyah; Islam Defenders’ Front head
Muhammad Habib Rizieq, and others. Some Islamic scholars attribute the moderate
character of Indonesian Islam to their perception that Indonesia is the least
“Arabized” of the major Muslim countries.[9]
Islam in Malaysia has also been deeply
influenced by traditionalist practices and beliefs. However, in modern times,
Islam in Malaysia has become more homogeneous and orthodox than in Indonesia.
This is largely the result of the centralization of religious authority under
the sultanate system and the role that government has played in defining religious
orthodoxy. The development of a centralized religious authority to oversee
Islamic affairs in the Malay States began under the British administration.
Religious officials were engaged as government functionaries at the state
level. After independence, the constitution established the country’s nine
sultans as the final arbiters in matters relating to religion.[10]
The result was enforced Sunni orthodoxy. Heterodox religious movements, largely
tolerated in Indonesia, were suppressed in Malaysia as “cults.” On 21 October
1994, for instance, the government accused Darul Arqam, a major Islamic
movement, of spreading heterodox teachings, and subsequently banned them and
citing the organisation as ‘deviant’ and ‘deviationist’.[11]
Like other Southeast Asian Muslims, the
Muslims of the Philippines, who are collectively known as “Moros” or the
“Bangsamoro” (literally, the “Moro Nation”), have retained many pre-Islamic
beliefs and rituals. Historically, much of the knowledge about Islam among the
Moros was handed down from mouth to mouth and was connected with folk beliefs.
According to the sociologist Peter Gowing, there was general ignorance of the
Qur’an and even of the rudimentary teachings of Islam in the Philippines. After
the Second World War, however, the Muslim areas of the Philippines experienced
an Islamic resurgence. This resurgence was influenced by the religious revival
in neighboring Muslim countries, in particular by the dakwah movement
in Malaysia, and by the return of Philippine Muslim scholars from al-Azhar
University and other centers of Islamic learning in the Middle East.[12]
The Structure of Religious Education in Southeast Asia
The public education systems in the Muslim
majority countries of Southeast Asia include religious education. In Indonesia,
religious education in state-run schools is multi-religious. Every student who
belongs to any religions (Islam, Catholic Christianity, Protestant
Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism) is entitled to religious instruction in
his or her religion (although a minimum number of students is required before
instruction in a particular religion is provided). If no religious instruction
is available in accordance with the student’s faith, the student has the right
to be excused from religious instruction. Instruction in Confucianism can also
be offered as an option in state schools, although Confucianism is not a
recognized religion. The religious curriculum is set by the Ministry of
Education, in consultation with representatives of the different religious communities.Textbooks
are produced by autonomous publishers, but screened by the Ministry. In order
to enhance the teachers’ knowledge of other religions, the general competence
aims for the other religions are cited in the introduction to the curricula for
every religion.[13]
In Malaysia, unlike Indonesia, Islam is the
official religion of the state, and the only religious instruction provided in
public schools is in Islam. It is, however, not mandatory for non-Muslim
students to study Islam. In the Philippines there is no state religion and the
Constitution provides for the separation of Church and State. The government,
however, makes public schools available to church groups to teach moral values
during school hours.
Aside from religious instruction in state schools,
Islamic education is also provided throughout Southeast Asia at the primary and
secondary levels through boarding schools.[14]
In Malaysia and southern Thailand these
schools are known as “pondok”; in Indonesia, such boarding schools are known as
“pesantren.” Indonesia also has Islamic day schools known as “madrasas”
(confusingly for Westerners, who associate the term “madrasa” with the boarding
schools of the Middle East and South Asia).[15]
The majority of the Indonesia’s pesantren are affiliated with the
traditionalist NU organization. A smaller number adhere to the modernist
doctrines of the Muhammadiyah and Persis organizations, and only a very small
minority teaches extremist interpretations of Islam.[16]
In Indonesia, most pesantren and madrasas
include instruction in secular subjects in their curricula.[17]
Nevertheless, these institutions have a religious purpose to teach Islam
through the reading and rote memorization of the Quran. Successful students are
those who are able to recite passages from the Quran in Arabic without
mistakes, even though many of these students do not fully understand in Arabic.
Senior students at these institutions are taught more complicated Islamic
doctrines—for example, Islamic theology, law, and ethics. Since textbooks are
largely only available in Arabic, learning the Arabic language and how to
translate those textbooks into the local dialect constitutes a major part of
the teaching process and is carried out by the teacher with every student
individually.In the Indonesian pesantren, students do not have a time limit for
completing their education, and they can leave a school when they feel their
knowledge of Islam is sufficient.[18]
Indonesia’s pesantren are run and often
owned by an individual religious teacher. The students are bound in a personal
relationship with their headmaster or teacher, who may promote a particular
ideology or interpretation of Islam.[19]
Many contemporary pesantren are now providing both traditional Islamic
education and modern national education. In addition to the general curriculum,
many kiai have found it useful to offer extra
courses—(English and computer science are the most popular)—as well as
vocational training in skills such as driving, automobile repair, sewing, small
business management, and welding. In part, this is in response to government
programs designed to encourage the improvement of human resources. In part, it
is a reflection of the fact that skills-training is a time-honored part of
pesantren education. Traditionally, students did not pay for their education or
lodging but worked for the kiai in exchange for
their expenses.
Even with the addition of secular and
technical subjects, the main purpose of the pesantren education, as noted
above, is to spread Islam. Pesantren values define a modernity quite different
from that practiced in the West. The values of Islamic brotherhood and
selflessness are seen as safeguards against heartless Western capitalism, and
“self-sufficiency” is taught as the ground of individual and the nation
continued independence. For individuals, this means that a person should
exercise the entrepreneurship that development requires, but controlled by
Islamic values.[20] These
values are by no means inconsistent with democracy. Over the past decade, more
thanone thousand pesantren have participated in programs aimed at promoting the
values of pluralism and tolerance, and at bolstering civil society. In one such
program, the pesantren students are taught to run issue-based political
campaigns, to conduct elections for student leadership, and to represent their
constituency both with pesantren leaders and the local community.[21]
In the rest of Southeast Asia, the structure
and curriculum of private religious education is quite different than it is
Indonesia. In Malaysia, for example, the Islamist party PAS exercises a strong influence in private Islamic
schools. Although the level of militancy in the Malaysian Islamic educational
system has never approached that of Pakistan, it has nevertheless worked to
sustain the fundamentalist politico-religious movement. In the pondoks of
southern Thailand, the national curriculum is taught in addition to Islamic
subjects. While in the past the Thai pondoks helped to preserve the local Malay
dialect in southern Thailand, instruction is now in Thai, as well as in Arabic,
which is needed for the study of the Quran. Nevertheless, as discussed in the
next section, pondoks in Southern Thailand reportedly serve as recruitment
centers for a violent separatist campaign. In the Philippines, the Islamic
schools within the formal education system—that is, those accredited by the
state—are generally moderate, but there are a few unaccredited radical
madrasas, some of which are funded by the Saudis.[22]
Radical Schools in Southeast Asia
In Indonesia and Malaysia, a small number of
radical Islamic schools have served as incubators for the violent fringe of the
Islamist movement in Southeast Asia, including the regional terrorist
organization Jemaah Islamiyah and its political front, the Majlis Mujahidin
Indonesia (MMI). Other
schools, such as the Yala Islamic College in southern Thailand, have been
conduits for Wahhabi influence.
According to Southeast Asia terrorism expert
Zachary Abuza, the Indonesian security services believe that presently 60-100
pesantren serve as centers of JI recruitment and ideological indoctrination.[23]
In this category of terrorist incubators are the Pondok al-Mukmin in Ngruki,
Sukohardjo in Solo (Surakarta), Mutaqin in Jabarah, Dar us-Syahadah in
Boyolali, all in Central Java; al-Islam in Lamongan, East Java; and the
Hidayatullah network in East Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Jaafar Umar Thalib, the
leader of the now disbanded Laskar Jihad, administers another pesantren, Ihya
as-Sunnah in Yogyakarta.[24]
Although their number is relatively small in a universe with thousands of
schools, these radical pesantren have had a disproportionate influence in
shaping and propagating radical Islam in Southeast Asia.
The most notorious of these institutions is
Pondok al-Mukmin, an educational institution that some have referred to as “the
school of terrorists.” Pondok Al-Mukmin was established in 1971 by two radical
Indonesian figures, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. In 1973 the
pesantren moved to its current location in Ngruki, Central Java. From 1978 to
1982, Ba’asyir and Sungkar were imprisoned by the Suharto government on charges
of subversion. After their release, the two fled to Malaysia to escape
re-arrest.[25] In
Malaysia, Ba’asyir and Sungkar, together with Abu Jibril (alias Fikiruddin,
alias Mohamed Iqbal), an Indonesian veteran of the Afghan jihad, established
the Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem school in Ulu Tiram, Johor state, modeled on
Al-Mukmin. During this Malaysian period, Ba’asyir and Sungkar joined forces
with another Indonesian Afghan war veteran and former Ngruki student who was
also a member of the al-Qaeda shura, Riduan
Isamuddin, alias Hambali, to found the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI).
Ba’asyir, Sungkar and several other exiles
returned to Indonesia in 2000, after the downfall of Suharto and his
government. Sungkar died soon thereafter of natural causes and Ba’asyir became
the emir or spiritual leader of JI, as well as emir of the governing council of
the JI’s political front, the MMI, which was
formally launched in Yogyakarta in 2000. Ba’asyir was arrested following the
Bali bombing of October 2002 and charged with treason. He was, however,
convicted of lesser charges and sentenced to three years in prison—a sentence
that the Supreme Court later reduced to eighteen months (amounting to time
already served) in March 2004. Upon his release, Ba’asyir was re-arrested,
tried and convicted in March 2005 of conspiracy charges—a crime that carries a
maximum term of five years—and sentenced to two and a half years in prison.
Ba’asyir’s second arrest was on retroactive terrorism charges. Indonesia’s
Constitutional Court declared the use of the anti-terrorism law retroactively
unconstitutional in July 2004, but made an exception for the Bali bombing.
Pondok al-Mukmin’s reputation as a seedbed
of terrorism is well deserved. The school produced dozens of convicted
terrorists linked to three major bombings in Indonesia and at least two dozen
smaller terrorist attacks.[26]
Noor Huda Ismail, a graduate of the school, reported that the school taught
nothing but an extremist form of Islam. The only music blasting from the
speakers was an Arab song about jihad. Printed Arabic calligraphy covered the
dormitory walls. One of them read: “Die as a noble man or die as a martyr.” Inside
the school’s walls, he says, anti-Semitism was rampant. In Thursday night
public speaking classes, the most popular subject was the threats facing Islam.
Speakers often quoted the verse in the Quran that reads: “the infidels and Jews
will never stop fighting us until we follow their religion.” Ismail reported
that days before his graduation the school’s faith teacher, Aburrohim (alias
Abu Husna), invited him and five other students to join JI. Those who agreed to
join received military training in Afghanistan (before the downfall of the
Taliban) and at Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao.[27]
An important component of the broader
jihadist network in Indonesia is centered on the island of Sulawesi. This is
the Makassar-based organization Komite Pengerak Syariat Islam (Committee for
Upholding Islamic Law—KPSI), previously known as the Preparatory Committee for
the Upholding of Islamic Law (KPPSI). The armed
wing of the KPSI, the Laskar
Jundullah, is responsible for a great deal of sectarian violence in the
Moluccas and Sulawesi.The KPSI is linked to
the MMI and JI through Agus
Dwikarna, the head of the Laskar Jundullah and a member of the MMI executive committee. (Dwikarna was arrested at
the Manila airport in March 2002 and charged with carrying explosive
materials.) According to the International Crisis Group, the head of the KPSI, Abdul Aziz Qahhar Muzzakar, also runs a
pesantren in Makassar that serves as the local branch of the so-called
“Hiyadatullah network,” named after the militant Islamic magazine Hiyadatullah.[28]
In Thailand, the Yala Islamic College, with
about 800 students, teaches hard-core Wahhabi beliefs. The college is headed by
Dr. Ismail Lufti, a graduate of Riyadh’s Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic
University, and reportedly receives funding from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
Kuwait.[29]
The Thai government believes that a number of Islamic boarding schools in the
southern provinces serve as breeding grounds and recruitment centers for
militants who are carrying out terrorist attacks in the southern provinces. A
number of the Muslim separatists killed in attacks on police and security
forces posts on April 28, 2004 were teachers at local Islamic schools.[30]
The reaction of regional governments to
these terrorist schools has been somewhat uneven. The Malaysians have shut down
the Tarbiyah Luqmanul Hakiem school, as well as another radical school, the
Sekolah Menengah Arab Darul Anuar in Kota Baru. In Indonesia, however, Pondok
Mukmin and other radical pesantren continue to operate. Until the Bali bombing,
many radical and violent groups enjoyed the support of mainstream politicians,
such as the former Vice President Hamza Haz, who visited Ba’asyir at his
headquarters in the Al-Mukmin pesantren. After the Bali bombing in October
2002, the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah mounted a joint campaign
against terrorism—a welcome change from the passivity of moderates toward the
threat of radicalism and violence in the name of Islam.[31]
In Thailand, after the incidents of April 28, 2004, which involved multiple
attacks by hundreds of militants on police stations and security posts
throughout the southern provinces, and culminated in the storming of the Kru Se
mosque in Pattani by the army, causing the deaths of 110 militants who had
taken refuge in the mosque, the Bangkok government proposed a large-scale
closing of Islamic schools and arrests of teachers accused of advocating
violence against the state.[32]
Islamic Universities
The most extensive and sophisticated system
of university-level Islamic education in Southeast Asia—and perhaps in the
entire world—is in Indonesia. The Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic University,
formerly the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) or State Institute for Islamic Studies, is
comprised of 47 colleges and universities with over 100,000 students. The IAIN system draws many of its students from the pesantren since, until years ago, a pesantren education did not provide access to other
universities.[33]
The university’s overarching aim is to
produce tolerant graduates with a modern, “rational Islam” outlook. The
university has nine faculties, including a Faculty of Theology (Fakultas
Ushuluddin), which includes a Department of Comparative Religion, a Faculty of
Sharia (Fakultas Syari’ah) and a Center for Women’s Studies. Perspectives of
comparative religion have been included in Islamic studies at IAIN, together with interfaith, human rights and
gender issues. The IAIN also
publishes two noteworthy academic journals, Studia Islamika and Kultur, which publish articles by Indonesian and
Western Islamic scholars. According to Amin Abdullah, the rector of IAIN in Yogyakarta, IAIN has long been at the forefront of issues such
as interfaith dialogue and at improving overall relations between Islam and the
West (“we must explain to the Saudis that they misunderstand the West”).
Another major system of Islamic university
education is associated with the Muhammadiyah. The Muhammadiyah model of
university education is based on the Dutch system, and includes the teaching of
religious subjects that reflect, naturally, Muhammadiyah’s modernist beliefs
and principles. A third Islamic university is the Islamic University of
Indonesia. Both the IAIN and
Muhammadiyah universities subscribe to democratic and pluralistic values.After
the downfall of President Suharto’s government in 1998, IAIN developed a civic education course to replace
the previously mandatory state ideology courses with a new curriculum designed
to teach democracy in an Islamic context. This course has been made mandatory
for all students in the IAIN system and has
proven so successful that the Muhammadiyah network also developed its own
mandatory democratic civic education course.
In Malaysia, the system of Islamic
university education has gone a different route. As part of its Islamization
program, the Mahathir government established the International Islamic
University (IIU) near Kuala
Lumpur. As the university’s name indicates, its approach to Islamic studies
reflects a universalistic interpretation of Islam that is closer to that of
religious institutions in the Arab world.
In the Philippines, there are some Islamic
colleges, but no Islamic university.The Mindanao State University, a secular
institution with nine campuses, has a majority Muslim student body. The main
campus of the university and its three branches are within the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) at Marawi
City, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Tawi Tawi and Sulu, respectively.There is an Institute
of Islamic Studies at the University of the Philippines that conducts research,
but in order to receive the required education in Islamic studies required of
an alim, a Filipino student must go abroad.
Thailand plans to establish its first
Islamic university in 2005. The university will be a branch of Egypt’s al-Azhar
University. The Thai government will provide most of the funding for the
project, but the university will seek financial assistance from outside
sources, including from Muslim countries.[34]
This development should be watched, as it is likely to impact the overall
political and intellectual dynamic of Islam in Thailand and elsewhere in
Southeast Asia.
Conclusion
Southeast Asia has an extraordinarily large
and well-developed structure of Islamic education that can be a resource of
critical importance in the ongoing war of ideas within Islam. These
institutions can be expected to keep the Muslim communities in Southeast Asia
rooted in their moderate and tolerant values, despite the apparent onslaught of
extremist ideology from the Middle East. At a global level, they could serve as
the building blocs of a moderate or liberal Muslim international movement to
counter the influence of radical Salafi networks.
[1] (Mahmada, 2004)
[2] For instance, at the
haul (anniversary of death) of an important kiai (religious teacher) in East Java in 2001,
thousands of religious students jointly performed two million recitations of
the chapter Al-Ikhlas and several hundred of the entire Qur’an, generating a
great amount of merit that added to the spiritual power that the deceased was
able to exert from the grave. (Bruinessen, 2002)
[3] (Ramage, 1999)
[4] (Maarif, 2015)
[5] (Octaviani & Rosiana, 2016)
[6] (Velasufah, 2019)
[7] (Perlez, 2003)
[8] (Setiawan, 2020)
[9] (Velasufah, 2019)
[10] (Mutalib & Kua, 1993, pp. 20-6)
[11] (Means, 2009, p. 132)
[12] (Horizon, 1974, pp. 212-8)
[13] (OECD & ADB, 2015)
[14] (Musfiroh, 2017)
[15] (Setiawan, 2018)
[16] (Setiawan, 2018)
[17] (Setiawan, 2020)
[18] (Setiawan, Puspaningrum, & Umam, 2019)
[19] (Siayah, Conversation with Syarofis Siayah in Malang
on 4 October 2019, 2019)
[20] (Tan, 2014)
[21] (Siayah, 2010)
[22] (Velasufah, 2019; Musfiroh, 2017)
[23] (Djafar, 2018 , pp. 58-9)
[24] (Mohammad & Sujoko, 2004)
[25] (International Crisis Group, 2002)
[26] (Coulson, 2017)
[27] (Media Indonesia, 2020)
[28] (International Crisis Group, 2002)
[29] (Bradley, 2004)
[30] (Liow, 2006)
[31] (Mahmada, 2004)
[32] (Liow, 2006)
[33] (Meuleman, 2005, pp. 283-8)
[34] (Pathan, 2004)
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